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IN THE

SUPRE~ffi

COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CARNA L. PETERSON, by LARRY
BROADHEAD, guardian,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
DAVID H. CARTER and JANET
S. CARTER,

Case No. 15,310

Defendants-Respondents,
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICE,
Intervenor.
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
This appeal contests the findings of the Trial Court
that Carna Peterson understood the transaction with the
respondents.

The respondents allege in their brief that the

Trial Court correctly decided the issue of Carna Peterson's
competency, and further argue that the appellant lacks
standing to bring this appeal.

This brief is necessary to

outline those additional factors which should be considered
by this Court showing the great weight of evidence against
the court's finding, and to answer the allegations raised by
the respondents' attack on appellant's standing to bring
this appeal.
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POINT I
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS CLEARLY AGAINST TH

E TRIA;_

COURT'S FINDING THAT CARNA PETERSON UNDERSTOOD THE TRANSACTION WITH THE RESPONDENTS.
The respondents argue in their brief that Carna Pete

rso:

coherently expressed her purpose in selling the subject
property. They would have the Court believe that the transaction proceeded smoothly without incident and that Carna
Peterson and "her" attorney, Milton Harmon consummated the
sale. of her home over a period of two days.
A close reading of the record on appeal, however, would
indicate that the respondents had "their" attorney, Milton
Harmon, present to oversee the transaction.
attorney was paid by the respondents.

(R. 76).

The

(R.l73). It is readi!.'
I

conceded by the appellants that Carna Peterson trusted the
attorney,

(R.84), but when the later actions of the only

other independent witness Don Gowers are examined, it is
clearly shown that something was indeed wrong with the
transaction.
Don Gowers testified under oath that he was induced to

I
I

come to the rest home by the respondents to merely talk wilfil
Hrs. Peterson about the lien.

(R.l32) .

He further testifi,'

that he had no knowledge that any deed was going to be
signed.

(R.l32).

Finally, due to the fact that Don Gowers I

felt that Carna Peterson was incapable of handling her

o~

business affairs he then left the room wanting no part of
the transaction.

(R.l32).

Immediately after leaving the
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i

room, the respondent, David Carter, cornered Don Gowers and
told him that he should not contact the family of r~s.
Peterson about the purchase because, as Mr. Gowers put it:
"he didn't want me to mess this purchase up like I did the
previous one."

(R.l36). If indeed the transaction were done

in a truly arms length fashion with a competent person,
there would have been no need for the respondent, David
Carter, to approach Don Gowers with that type of veiled
threat, nor would there be any need for him to leave the
room of the transaction, wanting no further part of it.
Respondents would further have the Court believe that
when Milt Harmon was questioning Carna Peterson regarding
her intent to sell the property, that the conversation
proceeded in a smooth manner with Mrs. Peterson immediately
responding to the questions being put to her.

There is

nothing in the evidence, however, that supports that contention.

(R.77-78). Further, the respondents argue that the

day of the execution of the deed, Carna Peterson must have
had one of her lucid intervals.

The testimony of independent

witnesses, however, is contrary to that implication.

For

example, all of the witnesess testified that there had been
very little, if any, deterioration of her mental state from
the time of the transaction to the time of her testimony in
Court.

(R.57, 119, 129). Mrs. Garfield testified that Carna

Peterson could carry on a conversation during her bright
periods but she was never really alert.

(R.57).

Kathleen

Broadhead testified that she could carry on a conversation
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at times but that if she wrote you a letter at that same
time, it didn't make any sense.

( R. 6 6) .

Juanita Crawford

testified that on her bright days she could eat breakfast
and could care for her personal hygiene,

(R.ll8), but was

not competent in September of 1975 to handle a real estate
transaction.

(R.ll7).

Elsie Johnson further testified that

she could carry on a conversation on her bright days,

(R.l)o

but was incapable of handling financial matters in September
of 1975.

(R.l28).

These witnesses testimony have

forcef~

impact when it is considered that Carna L. Peterson was
declared incompetent on the 13th of November, 1975 by order
of the Fifth Judicial District Court. That hearing, \vith
Judge Harlin Burns sitting as Judge in Probate No. 1,896
was a mere two months after the execution of the deed and
the Trial Court was requested to take judicial notice of
that finding.

(R.256).

The inconsistencies of Milt Harmon's testimony show the,
misplaced reliance of the Court upon this witness.

For

example, Milt Harmon testified that the deed was executedo:
I

September 3.

(R.85).

The deed, however, clearly reflects,

that it was signed on September 2, 1975 and recorded the
next morning.

(E P-3). When the witness was confronted wit'

this inconsistency, he testified that he was hazy on the
date because of the intervening Labor Day holiday.

(R. 83). I

on cross-examination, however, this inconsistency became
even more obscure when he testified that, "I do recall tha::
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there was a day intervening and that I put a date on this
deed that it says the 2nd, and I'm sure that it's now my
recollection as it wasn't until the 3rd."

(R.90).

This was

in response to being questioned about the fact that Labor
Day was on Monday, September 1, and thus of necessity there
would have to have been a three day intervening holiday if
this testimony were to be believed.
When asked whether he knew what the respondents were
paying for the house, Milt Harmon categorically answered
that-he did not know what the respondents were paying for
the house only that $1,000.00 was going to the family and
the balance of the money would go to the welfare department
to satisfy their lien.

(R.88-89). However, when cross-

examined about plaintiffs' Exhibit P-4, which clearly indicated that he had received notice of the purchase price
sometime shortly after August 29, 1975, the witness admitted
that he had recalled getting the letter and discussed the
matter with the respondents.

(R.99-100.

Compare R.245).

Mr. Harmon further testified that he called Anna
Broadhead to tell her of the transaction on September 2,
1975.

(R.79).

He claims that Mrs. Broadhead called him back

either that evening or the next morning.

Linda Garfield,

however, testified that Milt Harmon called Anna Broadhead on
the 3rd of September and she was present when that phone
call took place.

(R.50.

Compare R.l37).

This is critical

since that phone call would have been after the deed was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
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signed and recorded.
Milt Harmon testified that LeRoy Jackson and he had a
phone conversation demanding return of the property and he
conveyed that message on to the respondents.

(R. 91-92).

The respondent David Carter testified, however, that he had
never had that conversation with Mr. Harmon and was

unawa~

of any problem until he received the demand letter from the
plaintiff's attorney, marked as plaintiff's Exhibit 7.
(R.l77, R.241, R.239). This testimony was further weakened
by his admission that he felt:

"That before the deed had

been signed and the transaction completed that the family
should be contacted." (R.90).

In addition, instead of

having Mrs. Peterson executing the affidavit of survivorship
which became part of plaintiffs' Exhibit 6, Milt Harmon had
the respondents execute the same.

(R.252. Compare Exhibit

P-6).

The respondents argue that Larry Broadhead, as spokesman
for the family, clearly authorized and gave his blessing
to the completion of the transaction.

However, Mr. Broadhea:

clearly stated that:
Q

And you said you had no objections, is that correc:

A

I said I had no objections, that my mother was

handling it.

At this time I had no interest in it, and at

that time I was not guardian of Carna Peterson.
Q

Yes. But at that time you didn't have any objectici

and you told him that?
A

I told him that I had no say on the matter and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q

\~ell,

A

At that time I didn't.

did you object to it at that time?

talking to my mother, no.

I didn't object to him

(R.l5).

In fact, the respondents testified that Larry Broadhead was
the only member of the family that they contacted regarding
the property and left it up to Milt Harmon to contact Anna
Broadhead.

(R.l72).

Respondents place a great deal of reliance upon the
Oklahoma Supreme Court case of Tate v. Murphy, 202 Okl. 671,
217 P.2d. 177 (1950).

Although not controlling in the State

of Utah, that case does show the type of things that the
Court may look at to determine capacity.

In Tate, for

example, the purported incompetent person continued to
transact her business affairs contrary to the situation
presently before the Court.

The Court found she was competent

because she:
"
• . paid her doctor and hospital
bills, her grocery bills, gas bills,
insurance premiums and taxes, all by
check. She collected her rents and
deposited them in the bank and placed
over $1,000.00 on time deposit.
She
had several Wills prepared . . . " 217
P.2d. at 181.
This is in direct contradiction to the fact situation
presently before the Court where the evidence clearly shows
that this 91 year old woman could not pay her own bills
since approximately 1970.

The Court in Tate further emphasized

that:
"While evidence of her mental condition
prior to and after the time she made the
transfers releasing herself of her property,
is import~nt and deserves careful considSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
-7Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

eration, her mental condition at or
near the time she acted is most important
in determining the validity or invalidity
of her acts upon that particular date.
It was generally admitted by witnesses
that her mental condition varied from
time to time, depending largely upon
whether or not she was suffering from
her physical afflictions, or was under
the influence of seditives given to
relieve her." 217 P.2d. at 182.
This is contrary to the case presently before this
Court.

Don Gowers got up in the middle of the transaction

and left because he did not feel that she was competent to
execute the deed.

Furthermore, independent witnesses testi-

fied that Carna Peterson was in the same approximate mental
state of awareness and capacity at the time she was in
Court as she was in September of 1975.

Finally, in

the~

1

decision, there was not a single witness who saw the incompetent person within ten days of the tranfer which is
contrary to the facts herein since Don Gowers, Juanita
Crawford and Elsie Johnson and other members of the family
saw Hrs. Peterson at or near the time of the signing of the
deed.
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court
errored in failing to find that this 91 year old woman
living in a rest home had the necessary capacity to execute
a deed and sale for her acre lot and home for

1

$3,200.00~

POINT II
THE APPELLANT DOES HAVE STANDING TO BRING 'l'HIS ACTION,
I

AND IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
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The respondents argue that this suit is merely a
vexatious claim in which the appellants
benefit.

will receive no

They admit, however, that the State of Utah which

is a party to this action, has standing and a valid interest
in the proceedings.

This Court has consistently held,

however, that:
"The reason the defendant has the right
to have a cause of action prosecuted by
the real party in interest is so that
the judgment will preclude any action
on the same demand by another and permit
the defendants to assert all defenses
or counter-claims available against the
real owner of the cause. Shaw v. Jeppson,
239 P.2d. 745 (1952).
The Court does have before it, the real parties in
interest and this claim of the respondents is without merit.
The respondents further argue that this claim should
not be before this Court since the consideration given for
the property was adequate.

They cite in support of this

proposition, 23 Arn.Jur. 2d. Sec. 66 on Deeds.

A complete

reading of that Section, however, clearly shows the misapplication of that proposition to the case at hand:
"Any valuable consideration, even a
nominal sum of money, is sufficient,
as between the parties and their
privieas, to render a deed operative
to pass title to property. Although
adequacy of consideration is an element
is a case where the instrument is
alleged to have been s~cured by fraud
or in a suit to set aslde the transfer
of an expectancy of to reform the dee~,
it is immaterial where the sole questlon is
whether a deed of bargain and sale is
operative to pass the property." (Emphasis
Added).
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It is clear from a complete reading of that citation
that the case before this Court is of a nature that the
argument of lack of consideration is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Upon a complete review of the record in this matter,
the Court should reverse the Trial Judge's finding that
Carna Peterson knew and understood the transaction she
entered into with respondents.

The great weight of the

evidence is against any other such finding.
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~!A

day of

AfM

.~
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